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An Economic Evaluation of Alternative Mechanisms for
Regulating the Internet
Rex Eugene Pereira
The University of Texas at Austin
Abstract
This paper utilizes an economic approach to analyze the strategic pricing behavior of the Internet service
providers (ISPs). The objective is to provide policy recommendations and guidelines for governance of the
Internet and to provide insights regarding optimal policies which should be implemented to govern the
Internet in order to maximize the net social welfare. The recommendation which emerges from the analysis
is that the optimal method for regulating the information superhighway is to implement a usage-based pricing
mechanism which will force users of the network resources to pay for their usage of these resources depending
on the extent to which they consume the resources. The best method of enforcing such a pricing mechanism
is by means of a tax on the usage of Internet connectivity by the users. The analysis predicts that there will be
a shakeout in the Internet Service Provider (ISP) market with many small ISPs being acquired by the larger
ISPs. A third prediction which emerges from the model is that the free-riders who try to utilize Internet
bandwidth without contributing to the expansion of the Internet backbone will be forced out of business.

Theoretical Model
A Model of Congestion on the Internet
The model uses the following notations:
Uh(•) = U h(yh, qh, c(Q,S)) = utility function of player h
qh = amount of Internet bandwidth (in Kbytes per second) demanded by player h
Q = 3h qh = total amount of the Internet bandwidth demanded by all the consumers
Ih = amount of money available to player h (Ih is assumed to be an exogenous variable)
I = 3h Ih = total amount of money available to all the consumers and providers of Internet connection services
yh = amount of money which the individual consumer h chooses to spend on other private goods (excluding the amount
which he or she spends on purchasing Internet connectivity)
S = amount of the congestible resource (the Internet bandwidth in Kbytes per second) available (S is assumed to be
fixed in the short term but variable in the long term.)
c(Q, S) = a congestion function
p = price (in dollars) of purchasing one unit of the congestible resource (that is, one kbyte per second of Internet
bandwidth connectivity)
= variable cost of providing one unit of the congestible resource (that is, one kbyte per second of Internet bandwidth
connectivity)
t = toll (or tax) imposed on users of the Internet per unit of the amount they spend on Internet access
Xy = MX/MY (partial derivative of X w.r.t. Y)
A model for a welfare maximizing scheme is presented below in which the Nash equilibrium behavior of the typical
consumer of Internet resources is typical if he or she takes (Q - qh) and S as exogenously given. The model takes into account
the consideration that there are n consumers of Internet resources, each of whom is made to contribute the fraction (1 / n) of the
total cost of providing the Internet bandwidth S. The optimization problem of the government is given by the model below in
which the objective is to maximize the utility of the consumer of the Internet resources, taking proper account of the external
costs.
The objective function of the government is given by
Maximize {Uh(y,q,c(Q, S)) | y + pq = Ih }
{y,q}
.
The objective function of the individual consumer is given by
Maximize U(y,q,c(Q, S))
{y,q}
.
subject to
y + p q = Ih - S / n
Proposition 1: If the typical consumer takes the Internet bandwidth demanded by other users and the
internet bandwidth supplied as exogenously given, such an individual fails to take into account the
impact of the extra congestion which he or she generates for others, unless that consumer is forced to
pay a congestion toll for access to the Internet services.
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Proof: The necessary first order conditions to solve the maximization problem represented by this model are obtained by
differentiating w.r.t. q and y as
(Uq + Uc cQ )/ Uy = p
(1.a)
If we assume that user h takes c(Q,S) as given, then
cQ = Mc/MQ = 0
Thus (1.a) becomes
Uq / Uy = p
(1.b)
Clearly, such an individual fails to take into account the impact of the extra congestion which he or she generates for others.
Implications: Unless a congestion toll is imposed on consumers for access to the Internet, the consumers of Internet access
will tend to use the Internet indiscriminately without taking into account the impact of the extra congestion which he or she
generates for the other users of the Internet. This is likely to result in an Internet traffic jam.
The alternative regulating scheme presents a model in which a tax (or toll) t is levied on the consumers which is proportional
to the amount of Internet access and resources they consume q. The proceeds of the tax go toward financing S, and any difference
between the total cost
S and total revenue tQ is raised from (or returned to) individuals in a lump-sum manner. The
optimization problem of the government is given by the model below in which the objective is to maximize the utility of the
consumer of the Internet resources, taking proper account of the external costs.
The objective function of the government is given by
Maximize {U(y,q,c(Q, S)) | y + pq = Ih - S / n }
{y,q,S}
.
The objective function of the individual consumer is given by
Maximize U(y,q,c(Q, S))
{y,q}
.
subject to
y + (p + t) q = Ih - ( S - t Q)/ n
The term ( S - t Q)/ n represents a lump-sum tax that may be required to bridge the gap between the per capita cost and the per
capita toll payment.
Proposition 2: It is feasible to impose an optimal congestion toll (or tax) on the users of the Internet
which will force the consumers of Internet services to consume a socially optimal level of Internet
resources, and will maximize the total welfare, while at the same time providing precisely the revenue
required to finance provision of the optimal level of the Internet bandwidth.
Proof: From the first order necessary conditions of the individual’s maximization problem, the individual’s optimization
behavior by differentiating w.r.t. q and y is obtained as
(Uq + Uc cQ )/ Uy = p + t
(2)
From the optimization problem of the government the necessary first order conditions are derived as :
p = Uq / Uy + n Uc cQ / Uy
or
p - [(n - 1) Uc cQ ]/ Uy = (Uq + Uc cQ )/ Uy
(3)
and
/ n = (Uc / Uy ) cS
(4)
Comparison of (2) with (3) shows that the government can encourage utility-maximizing consumers to consume resources at
the socially optimal level by setting
t = - (n + 1) Uc cQ / Uy
(5)
If the congestion function c(Q,S) is assumed to be homogeneous of degree zero in its two arguments, then from Euler’s equation
we obtain
cQ Q + cS S = 0
Equation (5) is then used to substitute for cQ , and noting that Q = nq, we obtain
n t q Uy / ((1 - n) Uc ) + cS S = 0
Equation (4) is then used to remove Uy / Uc, and we obtain
n t q / (1 - n) + S / n = 0
If it is assumed that there are an infinite number of consumers of the Internet resources (that is, as n becomes very large), n / (1 n) tends towards -1.
Hence in a large community of Internet resource consumers (which is a reasonable assumption), we obtain:
S = ntq = tQ
The result follows.
Implications: This result has important policy implications regarding the ability of the government to formulate policies
by implementing a usage-based pricing scheme which will result in a tax accruing to the government to recover the investment
which it has incurred in order to set up the networking infrastructure of the Internet, while at the same time forcing the consumers
of the Internet services to adhere to a socially optimal level of usage which will result in the maximization of the total welfare.
If an equiproportionate increase in quantity demanded Q and quantity supplied S increases congestion c, then the revenue raised
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by the optimal tariff is more than enough to cover the cost of providing the resources S. Conversely, if an equiproportionate
increase in quantity demanded Q and quantity supplied S reduces congestion c, then a supplementary lump-sum tax will be
required to be collected from each individual in order to cover the cost of providing the optimum level of Internet bandwidth.

A Model of Strategic Pricing of the Internet Service Providers
The model uses the following notations:
s = the bandwidth provided by a single firm providing Internet connectivity
S = 3n s = the total bandwidth provided by all the Internet connectivity providers
n = number of firms providing Internet connectivity
= price received by a firm for providing a unit of Internet bandwidth ( is assumed to be exogenously fixed)
F(S) = cost function of the industry
m = total income to a firm which provides s units of Internet bandwidth connectivity (m is assumed to be exogenously
fixed)
M = 3n m = total income to all the connectivity providing firms for providing S units of Internet bandwidth connectivity
S* = optimal value of S
F1(S) = dF/dS
F11 (S) = d2F/dS2
The breakeven point of the industry is given by
M = F(S), where F1(S) > 0, F11 (S) < 0
The assumption is made that all firms have a similar cost function. The cost function of the individual firm is given by
m = [s/S]F(S)
The above equation represents a pure homogeneous common property in which individual Internet service providers’ incomes
are in proportion to the bandwidths which they provide. The Pareto-optimal solution is found by choosing the optimal bandwidth
which should be provided which will maximize the total industry profit, . The objective function of the industry is,
Maximize (F(S) - S)
S
.
The optimal value of S, S* is uniquely determined by the first-order condition F1(S) = , and, in the current formulation of the
model, it is independent of the distribution of the Internet bandwidth provision between the competing firms. This is, the
allocation that would result from competitive exploitation in the presence of well-defined property rights.
Nash equilibria are characterized by profit maximization on the part of the individual firm, and (S - s) is treated as
exogenous. The firm’s problem is given by the maximization problem represented by the model below:
Maximize {[s/S]F(S) - s}
{s}
.
Proposition 3: As an increasing number of firms enters the market as providers of Internet connectivity
services, and the number of firms providing such services grows large, the firm profits will tend to zero.
Over-exploitation of the common property resource (the Internet bandwidth) is exacerbated by an
increase in the number of firms.
Proof: The first-order condition for the profit maximization problem of the model above is
= (s/S)F1(S) + ((S - s)/S)[F(S)/S)]
If the assumption is made that there are n firms each providing the same amount of Internet connectivity, then s/S = 1/n and (S
- s)/S = (n -1)/n. Therefore the first-order condition for profit maximization implies that
= (1/n)F1(S) + [(n-1)/n][F(S)/S)]
In other words, the price to a firm of providing Internet connectivity is equated to a weighted sum of its marginal product F1(S)
and its average product [F(S)/S]. In the case of a single firm n=1, and the weights imply that the price equals the marginal
product. As the number of Internet service providers grows however, and n becomes very large (say, n tends to infinity), the price
converges to the average product, thereby producing the result that, as the number of firms exploiting a common property
resource such as Internet connectivity grows very large, the price will be equated to the average rather than the marginal product
and the firm profits will tend to zero.
Implications: This implies that there will be a shakeout in the marketplace as an increasing number of firms tries to enter
the market as Internet service providers. As the number of firms providing Internet connectivity increases, there will be a greater
tendency for some of these firms to try to have a free ride by consuming the common property resource (the Internet bandwidth)
without contributing to the supply of the resource.
The non-cooperative Nash equilibrium of the game which is hypothesized is one in which the chosen actions ah, of player
h, satisfy the condition
Uh(a1,a2,... ,ah,...,an) >= Uh(a1,a2,... ah,...,an)
h
for any feasible alternative action a where the notations used are as follows:
Uh(a1,a2,......,an) = payoff (or utility) of player h in an n-person non-cooperative game
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n = total number of players (includes both the providers of Internet connection services as well as the consumers of
these services)
h = subscript of player number = 1,2,........,n
aj = action (or decision) of player j
Proposition 4: In a repeated game the threat of retaliation by the other players will discourage would-be
free riders (the Internet service providers who only provide connectivity services and do not invest in
expanding the bandwidth of the Internet backbone), thereby mitigating the tendency towards suboptimal equilibrium outcomes, assuming suitably high discount rates to weight future payoffs.
Proof: Consider the model given above. Suppose the players adopt a tit-for-tat strategy in the repeated game where the
payoffs are analogous to the Prisoner’s Dilemma, so that at each round the player making the choice adopts the choice which
the opponent has made in the previous round. Given a suitably high discount rate used to weight future payoffs vis-à-vis the
present, it can be shown that mutual cooperation is a Nash equilibrium. It is also the case that the one-shot solution with its
implied inefficiency, remains a Nash equilibrium in repeated play, regardless of the value of the discount rate. Thus, in a repeated
game the threat of retaliation by the other players will discourage would-be free riders (the Internet service providers who only
provide connectivity services and do not invest in expanding the bandwidth of the Internet backbone), thereby mitigating the
tendency towards sub-optimal equilibrium outcomes.
Implications: This implies that as the Internet becomes increasingly congested, the Internet service providers will have
to make investments in order to increase the capacity of the Internet backbone, rather than merely providing Internet connectivity.
The cost incurred in providing access is the fixed cost of providing the leased lines. There will be no incentive for the consumers
of the Internet access to consume more bandwidth than they would under Nash equilibrium conditions because this would lead
to a spiralling of prices for all the consumers given the nature of the economy being modeled.
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